Ukraine is a real life learning curve of the price of modern war and defence
The war in Ukraine is a distinctive representation of conflict in today’s world. We have to look closely at our role in supporting Kyiv to understand the price and lessons of modern war, writes Eliot Wilson
For those of us old enough to remember the war in Iraq, it is an unusual sensation to find in Ukraine a British military commitment which enjoys substantial public support. Of course we are not actively engaged in the war against Russia to defend Ukraine’s independence, and there is no substantial body of opinion which calls for UK boots on the ground.
Nevertheless, as the conflict approaches its first grim anniversary, we remain the second-biggest contributor of military aid to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government after the United States. In 2022, the UK government supplied £2.3bn worth of equipment and training, and will maintain a similar level of commitment in 2023.
Our support for Ukraine is, in geopolitical terms, fairly altruistic. We are backing Zelenskyy because Russia has clearly committed an unprovoked and unjustifiable act of aggression against a neighbouring country, and while it is, to a degree, a warning to others, it is also plainly the right thing to do. While we open our coffers, we should make sure that we pay attention to where the money is going and learn lessons of modern warfare.
The war in Ukraine has been a distinctive conflict. It was, to begin with, a reputational earthquake. As one cynic remarked early on, we used to think that the Russian Army was the second-best in the world; now it’s not even the second-best in Ukraine. But Russia’s military humiliation has not just been due to shabby equipment and dismal morale: they have seemed utterly unprepared for the kind of war which the Ukrainians have waged.
Three key weapons of war have been drones, anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft missiles. Stiff Ukrainian resistance using all of these weapons blunted the Russian attack from an early stage and it is significant that missile systems have been a major part of our contribution to the country’s capabilities. Since before the conflict even began, we have been supplying lightweight, shoulder-launched, fire-and-forget anti-armour missile launchers known as NLAWs which have been devastatingly effective. One Ukrainian officer suggested these cheap weapons have accounted for between 30 and 40 per cent of all Russian vehicles destroyed.
We have also supplied air defence vehicles and anti-aircraft missiles. These have contributed to denying Russia air superiority, which had severely compromised their ability to carry out strikes against Ukrainian ground forces and military and civilian infrastructure. Dominance of the airspace has been a prerequisite of effective offensive operations since the abandoned German invasion of Britain in 1940, and it has helped Ukraine stay very much in the game.
It is clear Russia will not achieve anything like a conventional victory. Indeed, President Putin is still very much at risk of humiliating and perhaps fatal defeat. But the Ukrainian conflict has not happened in a vacuum. It has taught us—or it should have done—that territorial defence can be achieved with relatively cheap, disposable weapons operated by a well led military force with high morale. It has also reinforced the resource disparity which our more sophisticated weapons systems embody: even a Russian T-90 main battle tank costs in the region of $5m, and if it is destroyed or taken out of service by a man-portable NLAW costing less than $40,000, that is a financial disparity which cannot be sustained.
International opinion is also critical. Ukraine has boosted its cause immeasurably by the skilful diplomacy and charisma of its president. His response to a US offer of evacuation, “The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride”, was iconic and he has won the support of nations across the world. The contrast with the remote, waxen, bloated Putin is glaring. In an interconnected world, none of us can afford to be isolated.
The UK still struggles with its international military posture. Although we are unlikely to face physical invasion by a larger neighbour in the way Ukraine has done, the course of the conflict should cause us to consider our strategic options. We have pursued a course of concentrating our resources in a relatively small number of high-value assets, prizing capabilities which are first-class over mass and deployability.
We have not fought anything resembling a conventional war against a state actor for 30 years; when we inevitably have to do so again in the future, we must be sure that we have prepared not only adequately but appropriately. The armed forces have not always proved successful at learning lessons in the past, so we should study conflicts in which we have a stake, like that in Ukraine, especially closely.